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The Legal Nature of the State Income Tax
By C a2 as R. LocXYEI*
After the inadequacy of existing federal and state revenue-
raising media became apparent in the early 1900's, both state and
federal governmental units resorted to income taxation as sig-
nificant revenue measures. Prior to this serious utilization of in-
come taxes, various courts evolved an elaborate assemblage of law
primarily concerned with three major types of taxes. According
to Justice Field:
The power of taxation is necessarily limited to subjects
within the jurisdiction of the taxing state. Those subjects
are persons, property, and business. Whatever form taxa-
tion may assume it must relate to one of these subjects.1
The grouping of Justice Field may be the basis for classifying
taxes into a functional arrangement. Professor Cooley accord-
ingly classified taxes as capitation or poll, property, and excise.
2
Legal provisions and technicalities applicable to the particular
category were generally applicable to all taxes within a class. For
example, a tax classified as a personal tax was subject to those
provisions and limitations common to the personal tax class. Con-
versely, legal provisions properly applied to property and excise
taxes were not generally applicable to a personal tax. The in-
creased use of income taxes presented courts (particularly state
courts) with the problem of ascertaining the nature and char-
acteristics of the income tax.
The form of legislation plays a very significant role in passing
upon the constitutionality of various income tax acts. Both fed-
eral and state governments apparently have the inherent power
to impose income taxes; therefore no specific constitutional grant
is necessary.3 Constitutional provisions generally limit rather
0 B.S., M.A., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio; Ph.D., University of Kentucky.
Research Associate, Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky.1 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 82 U.S. 300 (1872).
Thomas M. Cooley, TnE LAW oF TAXATIoN, Vol. 1 (4th ed.; Chicago: Cal-
laghan and Co., 1924), sec. 38, p. 118.
'Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920); Reynolds
Metal Co. et al. v. Martin et al., 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W. 2d 251 (1937); Stanley
v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.W. 2d 1000 (1929); and Featherstone v. Norman,
170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930).
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than expand this authority. In some instances, constitutional
provisions may be necessary to avoid the application of limiting
provisions to income taxes. Such provisions apparently are effec-
tive on both the federal and state levels. Determining whether
an income tax statute is in agreement with a given constitution is
largely a matter of constitutional interpretation. In the case of
state constitutions, the state rather than the federal courts gen-
erally resolve this matter inasmuch as no federal question arises.
Perhaps the experience in death taxation partially accounts for
the inclination of courts to explore the legal nature of income
taxes. Jurisdiction of states to impose death taxes, 'as defined by
courts in the past, created significant areas of possible multiple
taxation. Federal court decisions dealing with state jurisdiction
in the area of state death taxation relied heavily upon the nature
of the death tax. As a consequence of such decisions, the United
States Supreme Court, in effect, mitigated for a time much of
the load of multiple taxation arising from overlapping jurisdiction
among the states.4 Some writers speculated as to whether similar
effects may be obtained as a result of federal decisions in the area
of state income taxation.5 Up to the present time, no such effects
have occurred in the area of income taxation. The fact that in-
dividual death tax cases generally involved large dollar tax liabili-
ties, as compared with state income tax cases, may partially ac-
count for the lack of similar decisions. More important may be
the fact that later decisions in the area of death taxation indicated
a distinct reversal in the court's construction of the constitution
which tended to ameliorate multiple taxation among states. 6 As
might be expected, in the light of later developments in decisions
applicable to state jurisdiction to impose death taxes, courts
handed down few, if any, decisions that tended to mitigate
multiple taxation in the area of state income taxes.
In many states the problem of determining the legal nature
'First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 174, 76
L.Ed. 313 (1932); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed.
1056 (1930); and Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50
S.Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371 (1929).
'For example, see Henry Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 20
IOWA L. REv. 292-312 (1937).
" State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86
L.Ed. 1358 (1942). See also Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 59 S.Ct. 900,
83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383, 59 S.Ct.
913, 83 L.Ed. 1356 (1939); and subsequent cases.
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of the tax was squarely presented. Needless to say, the several
state tribunals variously resolved the problem. In addition to dif-
ferences in view, state constitutions and income tax statutes
helped to account for the diversity in opinions among courts of
different states. The drafting and later interpretation of the Ken-
tucky statutes involved considerable use of the experience of other
states. The comparatively late institution of an income tax in
Kentucky facilitated the extensive use of that experience.
The legal nature of the income tax is by no means of entirely
academic interest; rather it sheds light on several aspects of
practical importance. The nature of the tax is of much importance
in the determination of the constitutionality of the act. It directly
affects a state's jurisdiction to impose income taxes. It also plays
an important role in ascertaining which items are properly in-
cludable in income as well as determining the appropriateness of
a method for allocating the income that corporations derive from
two or more states. An analysis of income taxes, as classified by
the courts in Kentucky and other jurisdictions, precedes a con-
sideration of the relationships between the legal nature of the
act and the practical implications. Legislative intention as stated
in the statute may in some instances be an important factor
affecting the decision regarding the nature of the tax. The fol-
lowing discussion includes no analysis of the effect of such state-
ments.
AS A PERSONAL TAX
Strictly speaking, a personal tax is "a tax on the person with-
out reference to property as a capitation or poll tax... ."7 Inas-
much as states impose income taxes on income and not on a per
capita basis, most courts have refrained from classifying the in-
come tax as a personal tax. This category is perhaps the least suit-
able among the three traditional classes to embrace the income
tax. A few courts have considered the possibility of classifying
the income tax as a personal tax but rejected such a classification."
Other courts have suggested that the income tax is, in some im-
' Henry C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (3rd ed.; St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1933), p. 1705.
8 Forrester v. Culpepper, 194 Ga. 744, 22 S.E. 2d 595 (1942); Interstate Bond
Co. v. State Revenue Commission of Georgia, 50 Ga.App. 744, 179 S.E. 559
(1935); and Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930).
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portant respects, personal in nature. At best, the income tax
partakes of certain qualities peculiar to a personal tax. For ex-
ample, some decisions relating to the state's jurisdiction to im-
pose an income tax have suggested a similarity between income
and personal taxes. In Cook v. Tait9 the Supreme Court held a
nonresident citizen liable for federal income tax on income
earned from property located in Mexico. The opinion suggests
that an income tax is similar to a personal tax because the court
would probably not sustain a property or an excise tax under such
circumstances. The fact that citizenship rather than domicile con-
stituted the basis for the tax liability weakens the suggestion that
the court in Cook v. Tait regarded the income tax as partaking
of the nature of a personal tax. A personal tax liability generally
attaches by virtue of domicile rather than citizenship. In Law-
rence et al. v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi,0 the Supreme
Court sustained the Mississippi state income tax applied to a resi-
dent who earned his income in Tennessee. Although the Missis-
sippi court had previously held the tax to be an excise, the Su-
preme Court held itself concerned ". . . only with the practical
operation . . ." of the tax." The court declared that "Domicile
itself establishes a basis for taxation."
12
However in Shaffer v. Carter the United States Supreme Court
sustained the Oklahoma income tax on a nonresident domiciled in
Illinois. The court clearly rejected the contention that the state's
jurisdiction to impose the income tax depended entirely upon
domicile. Apparently the court did not regard the Oklahoma
income tax as a personal tax.
In summary, classifying the income tax as a personal tax in the
strict sense is an inadequate explanation of the tax. The income
tax possesses many characteristics quite distinct from a personal
tax. The state's jurisdiction to impose an individual income tax
is remarkably similar to the state's jurisdiction to' impose a per-
sonal tax as indicated by some court decisions. Aside from the
legalistic connotation of a personal tax, in popular usage there is
much to support the suggestion that the income tax is a personal
'Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 444, 68 L*Ed. 895 (1924).
"oLawrence et al. v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 52
S.Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed. 1602 (1932).
u Id.
1Id.
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tax. For example, some early taxes such as the class taxes of the
German states of Baden and Prussia were basically a personal tax.
That is, in the early 1800's the states divided the population into
a few groups and imposed taxes according to each class. In ad-
dition, the model individual income tax prepared by committees
of the National Tax Associatioln were likewise essentially personal
taxes by nature.
AS A PROPERTY TAX
The tendency of some state courts to regard income taxes as
property taxes may be traceable to the Pollock cases' 3 involving
the constitutionality of the federal individual income tax of 1894.
As indicated below, this interpretation of the Pollock cases ap-
pears questionable. The Pollock cases are also important inas-
much as they are among the few cases that contain a penetrating
analysis of the nature of the income tax. Generally, state courts
refrained from such analysis and based their decision on selected
decisions that previously grouped income taxes into the property
tax category. State court decisions, which classified income taxes
as property taxes, fall into two distinct categories. That is, the
property or subject of the tax is sometimes the income-producing
property or the income itself. Although most states adhere to the
former classification, Massachusetts and a few other states em-
brace the latter concept.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1917 ruled
that the income tax was essentially a property tax and that income
was the subject of taxation. 4 The court sustained the constitu-
tionality of the 1916 income tax. It held that the differential rate
structure was not in violation of uniformity provisions because
the legislature based the rates on reasonable classification. Not-
withstanding previous contrary decisions the court clearly dif-
ferentiated between income and income-producing property and
held the former to be the subject of the tax. The court stated that
the somewhat unique decision agreed with the uniformity pro-
vision of the Massachusetts Constitution and also with the "ordi-
nary and popular meaning"' 5 of income. The amendment ab-
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 155 S.Ct. 673, 39
L.Ed. 759 (1895) and 158 U.S. 601, 155 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895).
2' Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917).
15Id.
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solved all possible doubt of the legislature regarding the power
to utilize income as the subject of the tax. With the subject of
taxation determined, the court indicated that the definition and
measurement of income was essential to the tax. The jurists noted
that a time interval was an essential element of income. They
also noted that income as the subject of taxation resulted in a
broader tax base than if the subject were the income-producing
property. Apparently, the court regarded the tax as a property
tax on income received during a specified period. The Mas-
sachusetts court also classified the income tax as a property tax
and the income-producing property as the subject of the tax both
before and after Trefry v. Putnam.10
Courts of other states have likewise suggested that the income
tax was a property tax but that the income-producing property
was the subject of taxation. Two early Georgia and Missouri
decisions declared that an income tax was not a property tax.
17
In dissenting opinions the minority contended that income was
property and the subject of the tax. The tax, they contended,
was a property tax. These dissenting opinions were persuasive in
later cases in which courts held income taxes to be property taxes
and income the subject of taxation. The New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in an advisory opinion suggested that an income tax
imposed on income derived from property already subject to a
property tax would not constitute double taxation because income
was the subject of taxation of the income tax and different from
the income-producing property. The court held: "Money on
hands (sic) has been taxed as property in the hands of the owner
separate from the property producing it."'8 In the same case, the
dissenting opinion of Justice Robert J. Peaslee subsequently proved
influential in numerous state court decisions which differentiated
between income and property. This opinion materially aided in
the development of another concept of the nature of income
taxes. The Delaware Court of General Sessions held the income
tax to be a property tax and income the subject of the tax."9 The
Delaware court referred to the Georgia opinion as "very technical,
" Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915) and Maguire
v. Tax Commission, 230 Mass. 508, 102 N.E. 162 (1918).
"'7Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 839, 205 S.W. 196 (1918)
and The Mayor, Savannah v. Charles Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23 (1850).
'In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311 (1915).
"State v. Finder, 30 Del. 416, 108 A. 43 (1919).
THE STATE INCOM,,E TAx
if not illogical'' 20 for not regarding income as property and prop-
erly within the purview of the constitutional provisions ap-
plicable to property taxation. In State v. Pinder the court affirmed
the constitutionality of the income tax. The court declared that
exemptons allowed in the law were not repugnant to the con-
stitutional mandates of reasonableness and uniformity.
The Alabama Court in 1920 provided a most complete state-
ment to the effect that an income tax is a property tax and income
the subject of taxation.2' Apparently the court based its decision
on the following syllogistic reasoning:
To summarize: Money or any other thing of value, acquired
as gain or profit from capital or labor, is property; in the
aggregate these acquisitions constitute income; and, in ac-
cordance with the axiom that the whole includes all of its
parts, income includes property and nothing but property,
and therefore is itself property.
22
The confusion in logic stemmed from the fact that the court
regarded the acquisition and the thing acquired as synonomous.
However this reasoning proved quite persuasive for other courts
confronted with a similar question. The Illinois Supreme Court
in Bachrach v. Nelson reasoned that, "in accordance with the
axiom that the whole includes all of its parts, income includes
property, and nothing but property, and therefore is itself prop-
erty."12 3 The court accordingly declared the Illinois income tax of
1929 unconstitutional because the proposed rate structure did
not conform with the uniformity provisidn of the constitution
applicable to property taxes.
The Washington Supreme Court held the Washington income
tax of 1933 to be a property tax.21 Inasmuch as the tax was grad-
uated in relation to taxable income the court ruled that the law
lacked constitutional uniformity and therefore declared it uncon-
stitutional. In an overstatement, the court declared: "The over-
whelming weight of judicial authority is that income is property
and a tax upon income is a tax upon property." 5 More recently,
20Id.
=Eliasberg Brothers Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56, 11
A.L.R. 300 (1920).
= Id.
'Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 111. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932).
Culliton et al. v. Chase et al., 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. 2d 81 (1933).
- Id.
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the court held the Corporation Excise Tax of 1951 to be an in-
come tax which is a property tax "masquerading as an excise
tax. '26 The opinion is somewhat unique because the court held
the law in violation of the uniformity provision of the constitu-
tion even though the tax rate was a flat 4 per cent. Lack of
uniformity stemmed from the fact that the tax applied to corpora-
tions and competing co-partnerships and sole proprietorships did
not incur tax liability.
To classify the income tax as a property tax and regard income
as the subject of taxation suggests the application of a tax on in-
come in lieu of the ad valorem tax on income when received and
enjoyed. Implicit to the income concept is the time period. The
flow of taxable wealth during a given taxable period constitutes
the basis for an income tax. If the court classifies the income tax
as a property tax, the realistic possibility of imposing two property
taxes on certain items arises. Such double taxation is particularly
troublesome in those states with constitutional prohibitions
against double taxation. Notwithstanding the fact that double
taxation may legally exist in certain states, the situation may be
regarded as unsatisfactory.
Courts embracing the view that an income tax is a property
tax on income may sometimes find exemptions of minimum in-
come in violation of constitutional uniformity provisions. On the
other hand, exemptions of all income of prescribed recipients
such as educational institutions might be effective even though
not specified by statute.
The imposition of a tax on income does not lend itself to the
usual practice of placing the tax on property owned on a specified
date. Courts frequently cited this difference as an objection to
the classification of income taxes as property taxes. However the
Alabama court saw no objection to the alleged difference and
further held:
Nor is it of consequence that the money thus taxed has left
the hands of its quondam owner, however speedily; for the
state has the inherent power to tax property owned at any
time during the tax year, though it has not seen fit to do
SO.27
Power, Inc. v. Huntley et al., 39 Wash. 191, 235 P. 2d 173 (1951).
Eliasberg Brothers Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56, 11
A.L.R. 300 (1920).
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In the past most of the state courts placed considerable
reliance upon the Pollock cases when they contended that income
taxes are property taxes and income is the subject of the tax.
These cases may at best support the contention that an income
tax is a property tax even though the question presented in these
cases was whether the income tax of 1894 came within the pur-
view of a direct tax as used in the federal constitution. In the
various cases in which state courts held income taxes to be a
property tax on the income-producing property the fact that the
federal court previously held a tax on rental income to be a tax
on the land was persuasive. In the second Pollock case the court
held the federal tax on income from personal property to be
tantamount to a personal property tax. Professor Rottschaefer
and others regard the reliance upon Pollock cases to sustain the
tax as a property tax regardless of the subject of taxation as
"exceedingly weak."28
The view that income taxes are property taxes imposed on
the income-producing property is somewhat more popular among
states classifying the income tax as a property tax. Obviously,
this concept of income taxes refers primarily to partial income
taxes on iiacome derived from property and not other types of
income. Opinions suggesting that the income tax is a property
tax generally fail to distinguish clearly between those imposed
on the income itself or those imposed on the income-producing
property. The distinction is important in operation of the tax.
Application of legal provisions of a property tax are made with
reference to the subject. If the income tax is classified as a
property tax on income, the exemptions of minimum incomes are
usually unauthorized. If it is a property tax on the income-pro-
ducing property, exemptions may be allowed for income derived
from sources other than property. If the income-producing
property is the subject of taxation, jurisdiction to tax income is
dependent upon the state's jurisdiction over the income-produc-
ing property. If income is the subject of taxation, the jurisdiction
of the state to impose the tax is dependent upon the income rather
'Henry Rottschaefer, A State Income Tax and The Minnesota Constitution,
12 MiNN. L. REv. 683-715 (1928). See also People of The State of New York ex
rel. Cohn v. Graves et al., 300 U.S. 308, 57 S.Ct. 466, 81 L.Ed. 666, 108 A.L.R.
721 (1937).
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than income-producing property. Such general principles are ap-
plicable only to the extent that the courts respect these differ-
ences. Some courts have rendered opinions in which there is a
commingling of the subjects of the tax and consequently incon-
sistencies in areas of income tax application.
In the Pollock cases there was perhaps a closer endorsement
of the idea that the subject of taxation is the income-producing
property rather than the income itself in the light of the special
consideration of income from land and income from personal
property. Other early federal cases suggested that a tax on in-
come was on the property from which it was derived.2" The
Massachusetts court, upon occasion, held the income-producing
property to be the subject of taxation. 0 In De Blois et al. v.
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation3' the court held a
tax on income derived from real estate to be a tax on the income-
producing property. The court allowed abatement of income
taxes paid on trust income from rents because the legislature did
not express in words of "unmistakable purport" their intention
to impose a double tax on real estate which otherwise would
exist by virtue of the ad valorem tax and the income tax. 32 That
is, the ad valorem and income tax are two taxes both imposed on
the real estate.
The New Hamphire Supreme Court suggested a similar con-
cept of the income tax when it advised the legislature that rental
income attributable to realty located outside the state could not
incur an income tax liability.33 Compensation for the use of either
real estate or tangible personal property with a situs outside the
state would likewise incur no income tax liability. The court im-
plied that the income-producing property was the subject of the
tax.
,National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 277 S.Ct.
508, 72 L.Ed. 968 (1928); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 186, 275 S.Ct. 135, 72 L.Ed. 202 (1927); Gillespie v. State
of Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S.Ct. 171, 66 L.Ed. 338 (1922); Evans v. Gore,
253 U.S. 245, 40 S.Ct. 55, 64 L.Ed. 887 (1920); and Brushaber v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916).
o Bryant v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 291 Mass. 498, 197
N.E. 509, 102 A.L.R. 1 (1935); Kennedy v. Commissioner of Corporations and
Taxation, 256 Mass. 426, 152 N.E. 747 (1926); and In re Opinion of the Justices,
220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 70 (1915).
'De Blois et al. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 276 Mass.
437, 177 N.E. 566 (1931).
"Id.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (1930).
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The California Supreme Court held that the state may not
tax income from property exempt from taxation because a "tax
upon the income of property is, to all intents and purposes, a tax
upon the property itself."34  The court also held that double
taxation resulted if a given parcel of property was subject to a
county property tax and a state income tax on income derived
from the parcel of property. In Oregon the court ruled a partial
income tax on income from money and credits to be a property
tax and the income-producing property to be the subject of
taxation.
35
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania felt "hedged in by no
artificial restrictions arising from a peculiar or narrow interpreta-
tion of the applicable portions of our constitutions in former
cases"30 in passing upon the nature of the state individual income
tax. Accordingly, the court allegedly ascertained the nature of
the tax "along natural, and normal lines."37 The court held the
general income tax to be a property tax and therefore uncon-
stitutional because it violated the uniformity and exemption pro-
visions of the constitution. It is clear that the court regarded
the income-producing property as the subject of taxation with
respect to income from real estate, stocks, bonds, and similar
securities. The decision also served as a basis for ascertaining
the nature of income taxes imposed by the city and county of
Philadelphia.""
Many other courts noted important differences between in-
come and property taxes and rejected attempts to classify the
income tax as a property tax. The dissenting opinion of Justice
Robert J. Peaslee indicates the basic difference between income
and property taxes. Several courts have relied upon this opinion
to explain the questionable classification of income taxes as
property taxes. The Justice stated:
"Hobart Estate Co. et al. v. State Board of Equalization et al., 1 Cal. App.
2d 328, 36 P. 2d 407 (1934).
R edfield et al. v. Fisher et al., 135 Ore. 180, 292 P. 813, 73 A.L.R. 721
(1930). As in the case of several other income tax statutes the legislation as-
sociated the tax with one of the traditional classes.
"Kelly et al. v. Kalodner et al., 320 Pa. 180, 181 A. 598 (1935).
37 Id.
"City and County of Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338 Pa. 321, 12 A. 2d 79
(1940) and Sley System Garages v. City of Philadelphia et al., 135 Pa. Super. 440,
5 A. 2d 583 (1939).
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It is important that at the outset the fundamental difference
between income and property be stated; and then as we go
on it will be more plainly seen how and why the attempt to
treat the two things as one must necessarily fail. A man's
property is the amount of wealth he possesses at a particular
moment, while his income is the amount of wealth obtained
during some specified period. The two are measured by
different standards. One is measured by amount and pres-
ent possession. The other is determined by receipts, and
quantity and time are necessary elements of the measure
employed. In the measure of property present ownership
is an essential element, and lapse of time can have no place.
In the measure of income lapse of time is an essential ele-
ment, and present possession can have no place. Each is
measurable, but a common measure cannot be applied to
both. The two are as incommensurate as a line and an
angle.
39
Income and property taxes differ in that the latter imposes a
tax liability upon the existence of property owned while the in-
come tax is effective only upon the receipt of income, and with-
out reference to its continued existence.40 That is, the property
tax generally imposes liability at recurrent intervals based upon
property measured by the amount of present possessions and the
income tax imposes a tax liability upon income received over a
period of time and only once when the prescribed event (receipt
of income) occurs. Another difference is that the same funds or
property may sustain more than one income tax liability as they
may constitute income to any number of individuals during the
year.
41
AS AN EXCISE TAX
Of the three major types of taxes, the excise category is per-
haps the most usual classification used by courts in grouping in-
come taxes. A precise definition of an excise tax is lacking; how-
ever an act is the usual basis for excise taxes. In the case of in-
come taxes, the acts of doing business or earning an income are
possible bases for 'an excise tax. Income may be the measure of
the tax. That is, an income tax may be based upon an act or privi-
" In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 618, 93 A. 314 (1915)." In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927).
"Paine v. Oshkosh, 190 Wis. 69, 208 N.W. 790 (1926).
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lege and measured by income. In light of federal usage of the
term, the extent to which an excise tax is imposed as a quid pro
quo is questionable. Rather, some legislation suggests a very
broad use of the term and possibly includes most taxes otherwise
unclassified. It is apparently quite clear that the federal corpora-
tion income tax of 1909 was basically an excise tax. The Supreme
Court upheld its constitutionality on that ground. 2 The court
held the tax to be imposed on the act of doing business rather
than on the franchise. If the court had regarded the franchise
as the tax base the tax probably would be a direct tax and there-
fore subject to the constitutional limitations of a direct tax
existing at the time.
Courts on occasion have held state income taxes to be excise
taxes. The Supreme Court held an English corporation liable for
a New York income tax on the ground that the tax was an excise
measured by allocated income rather than a direct tax upon in-
come.43 The court upheld the tax based upon the privilege of
doing business; however, it is questionable whether the court
could sustain an income tax otherwise classified. In Educational
Films Corp. v. Ward the Supreme Court affirmed the Bass case
and sustained the New York tax even though the measure (in-
come) included interest from both federal and state instru-
mentalities. 44 The court reasoned that because the tax base was
the privilege of doing business, the tax was not actually imposed
on the federal instrumentalities and therefore constitutional.
Courts of Georgia and Missouri early classified income taxes
as excise taxes.45 The Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected the
property tax classification and held the income tax to be an excise
tax.40 The Mississippi court reasoned that the production of in-
come involved the joint efforts of the state and the recipient.
"2 Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 343, 55 L.Ed. 389
(1910).
"Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45
S.Ct. 82, 69 L.Ed. 282 (1924). The legislature referred to the tax as an excise
in the statute.
"Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 51 S.Ct. 170, 75 L.Ed.
400 (1931).
"Featherstone y. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930); Ludlow-Saylor
Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196 (1918); Waring v. Savannah,
60 Ga. 93 (1878); and The Mayor, Savannah v. Charles Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23
(1850).
"Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 25 A.L.R.
748 (1921).
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Protection afforded by the state made the production and enjoy-
ment of income possible. For this protection, the state may im-
pose an income tax. The court further ruled that "While a tax
on income includes some of the elements of a tax on property
and of a tax on persons, it cannot be classified as strictly a tax on
either, for it is generically and necessarily an excise .... ,47 In
litigation in several other states, courts have held corporation
income taxes to be excise taxes.48 Although the privilege or act
conferred by the state to a natural person which might constitute
the basis for an excise tax may become tenuous, some courts have
held personal income taxes to be excise taxes.49 The grouping of
the personal income tax as an excise raised some objections inas-
much as the right conferred by a state to an individual appears
,7 Id.
8 Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397, 90 A.L.R.
476, affirmed 291 U.S. 642, 54 S.Ct. 437, 78 L.Ed. 1040 (1933); National Leather
Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 277 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 534, 72 L.Ed. 935
(1928); Bowers, Collector v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 46 S.Ct. 449,
70 L.Ed. 886 (1926); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47,
108 A. 154 (1919), 254 U.S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 45, 65 L.Ed. 165 (1920); Bass, Rat-
cliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45 S.Ct. 82, 69
L.Ed. 282 (1924); Doyle, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
247 U.S. 179, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054 (1918); Commonwealth v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 363 Pa. 299, 69 A. 2d 410 (1949); Commonwealth v. Electrolux
Corp., 59 Dauph, 412, affirmed 362 Pa. 333, 67 A. 2d 105 (1949); J. M. and M. S.
Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 (1945)
Community Public Service Co. v. James, Tex. Civ. App. (1943), 167 S.W. 2d
588 (1943); Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A. 2d
62 (1942); Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 200 Ark. 233, 139 S.W. 2d
378 (1940); California Packing Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 97 Utah 367,
93 P. 2d 463 (1939); Hunton v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 414, 193 S.E. 534
(1937); Stanley Works v. Hackett, 122 Conn. 547, 190 A. 743 (1937); Turco
Paint and Varnish Co. v. Kalodner et al., 320 Pa. 421, 184 A. 37 (1936); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 525, 178 A. 621 (1935); Miles v. Department of
Treasury, 193 N.E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474 (Ind. 1935); Reed v. Bjornson et al.,
191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 103 (1934); O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization
et al., 95 Mont. 91, 25 P. 2d 114 (1933); Fernwood Lumber Co. v. Mississippi
State Tax Commission, 167 Miss. 273, 149 So. 727 (1933); Diefendorf v. Gallet,
51 Idaho 619, 10 P. 2d 307 (1932); Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.E. 2d
1000 (1929); Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925); State ex re.
Knox v. Gulf M. and N. Ry. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689 (1925); Standard
Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112 Ore. 314, 228 P. 812 (1924); Eaton Crane and Pike
Co. v. Commonwealth, 237 Mass. 523, 130 N.E. 99 (1921); and Hattiesburg
Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 25 A.L.R. 748 (1921).
" Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 200 Ark. 233, 139 S.W. 2d 378
(1940); Hunton v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 414, 193 S.E. 534 (1937); Miles v.
Department of Treasury, 193 N.E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474 (Ind. 1935); Reed v.
Bjornson et al., 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 103 (1934); Fernwood Lumber Co. v.
Mississippi State Tax Commission, 167 Miss. 273, 149 So. 727 (1933); Diefendorf
v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P. 2d 307 (1932); Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886,
19 S.W. 2d 1000 (1929); Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925);
State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf M. and N. Ry. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689 (1925);
Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112 Ore. 314, 228 P. 812 (1924); and Hatties-
burg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 25 A.L.R. 748 (1921).
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quite distant from the acts or privileges that usually constitute
the basis for an excise.50 It is equally difficult to regard the receipt
of income from out-of-state sources as an act or privilege, the
basis for an excise tax, by the state of residence.
Classification of an income tax as an excise results in sig-
nificant differences compared with the property tax class. Per-
haps the most important difference is that the uniformity and
double taxation provisions of the constitution applicable to prop-
erty taxes are inapplicable to excise taxes. Characteristic of in-
come taxes, particularly individual income taxes, is the grad-
uated rate structures. In most jurisdictions a graduated rate is
incompatible with uniformity provisions and therefore uncon-
stitutional as a property tax. Inasmuch as the income tax if
classified as an excise is not a tax on the income-producing prop-
erty, possible prohibitions against double taxation do not arise.
Compared with the property tax classification, income taxes
regarded as excise taxes may be subject to different rules with
respect to the allocation of income.51 In the Bass case the Su-
preme Court indicated that the New York corporation income
tax would be valid even though the operations of a foreign
corporation conducted within the state "may have yielded no net
income."52 The court apparently based this projection on the
fact that the tax in question was an excise on the privilege of do-
ing business based in part on net income. The fact that the tax
was imposed in lieu of a property tax was also significant in the
interpretation of the decision. Use of reasonable allocation formu-
las, regarded as an application of the unit rule of property taxa-
tion, generally meets with the approval of courts notwithstanding
the fact that the tax is classified as an excise based on net income
or a property tax on net income itself.
5
3
Whether the courts regard a state income tax as a property
50The Indiana gross income tax, somewhat distinct from most income taxes,
was held to be, with reference to individuals, based upon "the privilege of
domocile" [Miles v. Department of Treasury, 193 N.E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474 (Ind.
1935)].
"Joseph W. Huston, Allocation of Corporate Net Income for Purposes of
Taxation, 26 ILL. L. REv. 728 (1982).
'Bass, Ratdliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45
S. Ct. 82, 69 L.Ed. 282 (1924).
Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 199 N.C. 42, 153 S.E. 850, 283
U.S. 123, 51 S.Ct. 885, 75 L.Ed. 879 (1931); and Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47, 108 A. 154 (1919); 254 U.S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 45, 65
L.Ed. 165 (1920) (excise taxes).
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tax or an excise tax is significant in determining the extent to
which the tax base may include income from federal instru-
mentalities. In the Educational Films case the Supreme Court
sustained the New York corporation income tax even though the
tax base included income from federal instrumentalities.54 The
Supreme Court recognized "a logical and practical distinction
between a tax laid directly upon all of any class of governmental
instrumentalities, which the Constitution impliedly forbids, and
... (an excise tax) ... such as the present."55 Indeed, the court
expressed doubt as to the validity of the tax under similar cir-
cumstances if the tax were not an excise. In the light of more
recent cases it appears that income taxes in the nature of property
taxes are subject to stricter rules than excise taxes with reference
to taxation of federal instrumentalities, the nature of the tax is
apparently considerably less significant for purposes of determin-
ing the legality of income taxes applied to interest from other
state instrumentalities.
Another possible implication stemming from the legal nature
of the act concerns the jurisdiction of the state to impose the tax.
Viewed as a property tax the state's jurisdiction to impose an
income tax is in some respects narrower than if an excise tax.
Situs of property is of paramount importance in ascertaining the
state's jurisdiction to impose a property tax whereas the exercise
of an act or privilege is determining for an excise. As an excise
tax, the broadened jurisdiction enlarges the area of multiple
taxation more than is otherwise effective as a property tax. As a
legal argument against a tax liability, multiple taxation appears
to be impotent.
AS A DISTINCT CLASS OF TAX
Courts and various other legal scholars have manifested dis-
satisfaction with the three traditional tax classes for purposes of
classifying income taxes.56 The distinctive nature of the income
tax is such that none of the three usual categories is suitable
"' Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 51 S.Ct. 176, 75 L.Ed. 400
(1931).
5id.
Robert C. Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MiNN. L. REv. 127-145
(1983); and Charles L. B. Lowndes, State Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 6 Tmxr.E
L. Qut mTEny, 486-502 (1931).
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for the income tax. The income tax may bear strong resemblance
to other types of taxes; however the differences are of such sig-
nificance that the three categories are inappropriate. Some courts
have regarded the income tax as sui generis, that is, distinct and
peculiar to itself. In some states certain constitutional provisions
constitute an important factor contributing to the rejection of
the traditional classification.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin clearly rejected the three
traditional types of taxes and insisted upon a separate classifica-
tion for the income tax. In State v. Frear the court recognized
the distinctive nature of an income tax.57 Wording of the con-
stitution influenced the decision of the court which held the in-
come tax to be unique in nature. In rejecting the Pollock cases
the court stated:
However philosophical the argument may be that taxation
of rents received from property is in effect taxation of the
property itself, the people of Wisconsin have said that
'property' means one thing, and 'income' means another; in
other words, that income taxation is not property taxation,
as the words are used in the Constitution of Wisconsin.58
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also rejected the con-
tention that general individual and corporate income taxes are
property taxes.5" Although the court indicated that an income
tax may not properly fall under the property, personal, or excise
tax classes, it recognized distinct similarities between the income
tax and other types of taxes. Constitutional provisions in Cali-
fornia likewise suggest that the income tax is unique in nature.60
Like several other state courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
has held income taxes to be unique in nature. In Reynolds Metal
Co. v. Matin the court was primarily concerned with the problem
of detelining whether the income tax was a property tax in
order to ascertain the constitutionality of the law.61 The court
held that the income tax was not a property tax rather in the
nature of an excise, but added that "it is not necessary to call it
' State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673 (1912).
" Id.
Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Tax Commission, 129 S.C. 480, 124 S.E. 761 (1924).
Roger J. Traynor and Frank M. Keesling, The Scope and Nature of the
California Income Tax, CAL. L. REv., 505 (1936).
'Reynolds Metal Co. et al. v. Martin, et al., 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W. 2d 251
(1937).
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"62an excise. The court regarded the income tax as a contribu-
tion to government measured by the taxpayers' ability to pay
based on income. The tax obligated those domiciled or doing
business in the state to make the contribution. The protection of
government and other rights enjoyed by those subject to the tax
justified such a contribution. The opinion, like similar decisions
in other states, did not involve an analysis regarding the precise
nature of the income tax. The court relied upon selected previous
decisions of other courts and the wording of the Kentucky Con-
stitution in support of its conclusion. The Kentucky Constitution
refers to property, excise, and income taxes in addition to other
types of taxes. Reference to both excise and income taxes with
different provisions suggesting that the authors of the Kentucky
Constitution did not regard the two as synonomous. The court
concluded that it would therefore be improper to subject the in-
come tax to constitutional limitations of the property tax. Al-
though the problem which confronted the court was that of
determining whether the income tax was a property tax, it
recognized the distinction between an income and an excise tax.
An indication of the significance of this distinction to the corpo-
rate tax is apparent in light of the principle that a state may not
tax income from federal instrumentalities, although it may levy
a franchise tax measured partly by net income, including income
from federal instrumentalities.
64
The nature of an income tax is a question for the various state
courts to resolve in most instances. When classified as a property,
personal, or excise tax, the limitations applicable thereto are "al-
most always sufflcient to prevent the use of the peculiar char-
acteristics of the income tax which are the chief virtues."65 The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky avoided such limitations by ruling
that the tax was unique and different from the three traditional
classes of taxes.
The practical significance of the legal nature of the tax was
evidenced by other decisions involving an interpretation of the
wId.
'KY. CONST. secs. 170-174 and 181.
"The Pacific Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, 212 Cal. 148, 298 P. 489 (1931), affirmed
285 U.S. 480, 52 S.Ct. 424, 76 L.Ed. 893 (1932); and Educational Films Corp.
v. Ward 282 U.S. 379, 51 S.Ct. 170, 75 L.Ed. 400 (1931).
"Robert C. Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, MluiN. L. REv. 145
(1933).
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Kentucky income tax. In Martin, Com'r of Revenue v. Wolfford
the court relied upon the Reynolds Metal decision in which it had
been held that the income tax was not a property tax. The court
held that the tax was therefore applicable to the salary of a circuit
judge and did not violate constitutional provisions prohibiting
the reduction in salary of such an official while in office. 6 After
noting that the income tax was not a property tax, the court
stated: "If this were a tax levied against the salary of a public
official, there would be a diminution of his compensation and the
tax would be violative of. . . ." certain sections of the state con-
stitution.
6 7
The legal nature of the Kentucky income tax played an im-
portant role in the Martin, Commissioner of Revenue v. Gage.6
The state tax administrators took the position that an individual
domiciled within the state on the last day of the year would be
subject to income tax liability on all income earned during the
year including that earned outside the commonwealth prior to
becoming domiciled in Kentucky. Although courts of last resort
in other states had previously ruled that the state was without
constitutional authority to tax a resident upon income received
from sources outside the state before becoming a resident of the
state, the fact that the other state courts previously held the taxes
in question to be property taxes was of paramount importance.
69
Counsel for the appellants contended that inasmuch as the Ken-
tucky income tax was not a property tax, there were no such
constitutional objections. The Kentucky court held that such in-
come earned outside the state prior to becoming a Kentucky
resident was not taxable in the light of legislative intention.
The legal nature of the income tax was important in the
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Reeves, Commissioner of
Revenue decision.70 In this case the taxpayer secured certain
property in April, 1985 and disposed of such property at a gain in
'Martin, Com'r. of Revenue v. Wolfford, 269 Ky. 411, 107 S.W. 2d 267
(1937).
07 Id.
'Martin, Commissioner of Revenue et al. v. Gage, 281 Ky. 95, 134 S.W. 2d
966 (1939).
' Greene v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 221 Wis. 531, 266 N.W. 270 (1936);
Kennedy v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 256 Mass. 426, 152 N.E.
747 (1926); and Hart v. Tax Commission, 240 Mass. 37, 182 N.E. 621 (1921).
' 0Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Reeves, Commissioner of Revenue, 287
Ky. 522, S.W. 2d 337 (1941).
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February and May, 1936. The appellant contended that the
capital gain should be measured by the difference in values be-
tween the effective date of the income tax law (January 1, 1936)
and the date of disposition. The appellant argued that the state
was without "the power to impose an income tax upon the in-
crease in capital value of assets accruing ... prior to the date
the first Kentucky Income Tax law became effective ... -"71 The
appellant apparently based this contention upon the property tax
concept of the income tax. That is, the income tax would be in-
applicable to increments in asset value prior to the effective date
of the income tax if the income tax were a property tax. The court
held that the taxable event was the sale of the property resulting
in a gain even though some of it represented enhanced value to
the corporation before the adoption of the income tax. If the tax
were a property tax, the court probably would not have sustained
a tax liability on increment in the value of the property prior to
the effective date of the law.
